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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joshua Riggins challenges the district court’s order granting the State’s motion to
reconsider its order withdrawing his guilty plea. He argues the district court exceeded its
authority and denied him due process of law because it unilaterally took away his constitutional
rights to a jury trial, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. In response, the
State argues that Mr. Riggins has failed to identify a constitutional violation, the error is not clear
on the record because this is an issue of first impression, and any error is harmless because the
district court abused its discretion by initially granting Mr. Riggins’ motion to withdraw his plea.
The State’s arguments misconstrue both the law and facts, and are thus unavailing.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err by granting the State’s motion for reconsideration because the court did
not have the authority to reinstate Mr. Riggins’ guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Granting The State’s Motion For Reconsideration Because The
Court Did Not Have The Authority To Reinstate Mr. Riggins’ Guilty Plea
In his opening brief, Mr. Riggins challenged the district court’s authority to reconsider an
order granting the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea under fundamental error. (See App.
Br., pp.5–6); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). He explained that, by granting the
motion to withdraw, the court returned him to his status quo ante and “it is as if the plea had
never been entered ab initio.” (See App. Br., pp.5–6 (citing Williams v. State, 762 So. 2d 990,
991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).) Therefore, when the district court granted the State’s motion to
reconsider, it denied Mr. Riggins due process of law by unilaterally taking away his
constitutional rights to a jury trial, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him.
In response, the State first argues that Mr. Riggins has not shown constitutional error:
[Mr.] Riggins has failed to show any constitutional prohibition on a court’s
reconsideration of an order granting withdrawal of a guilty plea. The only
authority he cites, Williams v. State, 762 So.2d 990 (Fla. Ct. App. Fourth Dist., 2000)
(cited at Appellant’s brief, pp.5–6), relies upon a Florida procedural rule. Riggins
does not cite to, and the state is unaware of, any constitutional right implicated in,
much less violated by, reconsideration of an order granting a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea.
(Resp. Br., p.6.) The State’s assertion that Mr. Riggins has failed to identify a constitutional
basis for his claim is patently false.

As Mr. Riggins Appellant’s Brief makes clear, his claim

rests on the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. (See App. Br., pp.5–6 (“Criminal defendants enjoy the
right to a trial by jury, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. . . . Allowing
the district court to reconsider an order withdrawing a guilty plea in effect allows the district
court to unilaterally declare the defendant’s guilt; take away his rights to a trial by jury, to remain
silent, and to confront the witnesses against him; and in turn denies the defendant due process of
law.”) (citing U.S. CONST. amends. V and VI; IDAHO CONST. art. I, §§ 7 and 13).)
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Similarly, the State’s attempt to distinguish Williams because it “relie[d] upon a Florida
procedural rule” (Resp. Br., p.6), is curious given that Williams itself mentions no such
procedural rule, see Williams, 762 So. 2d at 991. The Williams Court cites to two Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) earlier in the opinion, neither of which has any bearing on this
issue.

First, Williams cited to FRCP 3.172 when explaining the background of the case.

Williams, 762 So. 2d at 991 (“The trial court found that Williams’s change of plea was voluntary
under [FRCP] 3.172, accepted Williams’s plea of nolo contendere, and set the sentencing hearing
for March 5, 1999.”). Second, Williams cited to FRCP 3.170(f) when discussing the court’s
discretionary decision to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea in the first place. Williams,
762 So. 2d at 991. Neither of those rules appear relevant to this issue (which would explain why
Williams itself did not cite to them when addressing this issue), the State has failed to actually
identify the “Florida procedural rule” on which it claims Williams relied, and counsel has found
no other rule to which the State could refer.
In fact, Williams cites only to cases to support its reasoning on that point. See id. The
first in the line of cases on which Williams relies, Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972), appears to have addressed a double jeopardy challenge and does not mention any
rules of procedure whatsoever.

Id. at 245. The defendant’s contention in Bell was that the

district court erred when, after allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, it allowed the
State to recharge him with a greater offense. Id. The court rejected the argument, explaining
that “[w]hen the appellant withdrew his plea of guilty and it was accepted by the court, it was as
if a plea had never been entered ab initio. To hold otherwise would cause the trial courts to be
apprehensive of accepting or allowing the withdrawal of a plea because such discretionary action
might prevent justice from being carried out.” Id. The remaining cases cited by Williams—
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Miles v. State, 620 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. Ct. App. Second Dist., 1993), and State v. McClain, 509 So.
2d 1360 (Fla. Ct. App. Second Dist., 1987)—similarly cite to the earlier cases, but not to a
“procedural rule.” The State’s attempt to distinguish Williams on the ground that it “relie[d]
upon a Florida procedural rule” is baseless. (Resp. Br., p.6.)
The State next claims that there was no clear error, apparently because Idaho has yet to
decide the legal issue in this case, while other jurisdictions have gone both ways on it.
(Resp. Br., p.6.) The State’s argument mistakes the very meaning of clear error. Under the
fundamental error standard, “the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether
the failure to object was a tactical decision.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (emphasis added). It does
not, as the State implies, require that the legal issue be “clear” or already decided. State v.
Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014) (“This Court has not held that for fundamental error to exist,
it is necessary for existing authorities to have unequivocally resolved the issue in appellant’s
favor.”) (footnote regarding the Court of Appeals’ holdings to the contrary omitted).
Finally, as for harmlessness, the State contends that Mr. Riggins had not shown
prejudice:
Here the district court abused its discretion when it initially granted
[Mr. Riggins’] motion. The sole basis for the motion was a claim of innocence,
which is not a legal basis for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea. Because the
only prejudice [Mr.] Riggins asserts is the right to retain an erroneous ruling, he
has shown no prejudice.
(Resp. Br., p.7 (emphasis added).) As an initial matter, the State’s characterization of the facts is
not entirely accurate. Mr. Riggins first said that he wanted to withdraw his plea because he was
supposed to be taking antidepressants (6/2/2014 Tr., p.5, Ls.1–25), and later said that he wanted
to withdraw his plea because he is innocent (6/20/2014 Tr., p.5, L.21 – p.6, L.14). The court
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expressly considered both Mr. Riggins’ innocence and depression when granting the motion:
Mr. Riggins, I am loathe to force a person to be sentenced when they’re
maintaining their innocence. . . . I did read the mental health evaluation and the
Gain which suggest that you have been suffering from depression, that you’re on
medication, that there are some concern[s] about your psychiatric condition, you
were walking to talk to a psychiatrist at some point.
Given that, I will allow you to withdraw your plea.
(6/20/14 Tr., p.6, L.16 – p.7, L.11; see also R., p.134.) Although on reconsideration the court
stated that “there is no meaningful indication in the record that Riggins’ depression rose to a
level that rendered his guilty plea constitutionally involuntary,” that does not change the fact that
the court initially granted the motion on both bases. (R., pp.163– 64; see also 8/22/14 Tr., p.4,
L.20 – p.5, L.19); State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 414 (Ct. App. 1987) (“In granting or
denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing has occurred, the district court is
empowered with broad discretion, liberal exercise of which is encouraged.”) (internal citations
omitted). Regardless, just because a court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion
brought based on factual innocence alone does not mean it abuses its discretion by granting a
motion due to factual innocence. The State’s assertion that the error was harmless because the
district court abused its discretion by granting the motion in the first place is factually incorrect
and legally unsupported.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Riggins respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
withdraw his guilty plea, and remand to the district court for trial.
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2016.

_________/s/________________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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